The answer: hidden service databases.” reported Idigitaltimes. “Since deanonymizing traffic through the entry and exit nodes is so difficult, the researchers began to wonder if there was anything else that sees when a connection happens. One year ago the researchers, Filippo Valsorda and George Tankersley presented at the Hack in the Box Security Conference in Amsterdam a de-anonymizing technique leveraging on the analysis of HSDir nodes. Now researchers have spotted more than 100 malicious hidden service directories (HSDirs) which are the relays of the network that allow people to visit hidden services. The experts presented the results of a four-month study conducted to test Tor network exit nodes for sneaky behavior, they discovered that a not specified Russian entity was eavesdropping nodes at the edge of the Tor network.
Early 2014, researchers Philipp Winter and Stefan Lindskog of Karlstad University in Sweden identified 25 nodes of Tor network that tampered with web traffic, decrypted the traffic, or censored websites.
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